


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Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001100090011-2



8 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Crisis Analysis via Simulations

1. I understand from some of my colleagues on the Intelligence Community Staff that you have recently expressed an interest in the general subject of "collection systems interaction" and in turn may be seeking ways to test this interaction via a simulation or exercise. As you can appreciate given my position I too have been concerned with this issue and have for a number of years been trying to focus both Agency and Community attention on the problem. I did get Director Colby to begin to address it but the problems he had to face towards the latter part of his stewardship totally deflected his attention. However, I was able to get the Agency's Office of Research and Development to spearhead an effort which resulted in the formation of a Crisis Management Analytical Team (CMAT) whose task was to study this very issue. (Attached is a precis of the CMAT project).

2. Granted this is but a small part of the question I understand you are addressing. However, it is the first time that such an analytical effort on the subject of Crisis Management has been made in CIA. What is really needed and what I think you may be getting at, is a parallel effort in Community terms. In my judgment this effort should have as its focus several interrelated questions which in aggregate summarize the instruments you have to perform your crisis and wartime responsibilities; how those instruments interact in normal times, crisis times and wartimes; and finally given the bureaucratic overlay of the various agencies concerned, who is your principal crisis advisor and what crisis instruments can you exercise on your own?

3. The issue of the DCI's role in crisis situations and in various wartime shadings is a very complicated and contentious one. There are wide variances in opinion even among the intelligence managers in CIA. Unfortunately until now we have not had a DCI who was either politically capable of or inclined towards addressing this issue. Your arrival gives us a clear opportunity to do so and do so hopefully within the context of an expanded Community charter. As a final point and as a suggestion aimed at giving you a more complete insight into this question I would like to suggest that you bring together those of us who head the various Community crisis facilities, plus IC Staff and


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ORD representation, for a brain-storming session on this and related questions, thereby giving you the benefit of our thinking, an opportunity for you to see what we are made of and perhaps thus begin a process which could lead to a more integrated and Community-wide crisis mechanism, which at present does not exist.



Vincent J. Heyman
Director
CIA Operations Center

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT ANALYTICAL TEAM

STAT The Crisis Management Analytical Team (CMAT), headed by [REDACTED] of the Office of Research and Development, was formed as a result of a felt need to evaluate the management of CIA processes, analytical and other resources during foreign crises. The team jointly sponsored by the Office of Research and Development and the CIA Operations Center is studying the methodological, technological and behavioral aspects of how the various information handling procedures and groups of people interact during these times, with the goal of identifying improved procedural and attitudinal modifications leading toward better use of intelligence resources and better support to policy levels during crisis times. This study necessarily examines relationships among CIA functions concerned with indications and warnings and identifies potentially fruitful areas of research that could be brought to bear on the broad issue of crisis management.

STAT As fundamental to this effort CMAT will shortly install a PDP-11/70 mini-computer in the 6th floor Task Force Area of the Operations Center to process simulations which will enable us to gain insights into how best to interact crisis procedures and players. We currently have available scenarios concerning an outbreak of hostilities between North and South Korea and one involving an [REDACTED] scenario postulating a conflict between [REDACTED]

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI	X		15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC	X		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE _____

Date

Remarks:

To 5 and 8:

May I have your views on the attached.

STAT



DDCI